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Abstract
Fierce inter-port competition requires to strategically consider the roles port 
size and incentives play in a port user’s port selection.  This paper contributes to 
literature by developing a simple game-theoretic model to address this particular 
issue.  We demonstrate that once port is selected the port size and the administered 
incentive level positively influences the level of port user’s production; that the 
port’s marginal cost incentive rate can change the firm’s location given the relative 
size of the ports; the changes in the incentive level set at one port should be more 
than the inversed relative port size to the other port.
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I. Introduction
Seaport (just port here below) is one important social overhead capital, and it 
bears many common features to what other social overhead capitals have.  That 
is, constructing a new port requires a huge amount of sunk costs of which a large 
portion is arguably recoverable fixed costs.1) It allegedly has a long gestation 
period before the port starts to recoup any positive returns from its investment. 
Towards the sheer requirements of construction costs typically contributed 
are subsidies and other forms of public funds by government and regional 
administrative bodies. Whereas, port operation itself needs relatively minor 
marginal costs compared with its huge amount of fixed and sunk costs. 
It is commonly said that port may be able to enjoy a natural monopoly with 
increasing returns to scale in producing port services i.e. port operation, which 
arises from various natural entry barriers due to its sheer size of initial investment. 
If a port is constructed, however, its monopoly status shall accrue only when 
it has such port users as shippers and cargo liners, cargo forwarders, logistics 
companies, quarantine and inspection services, etc.2)  Since the availability of 
port users are not taken for granted the port has to find measures to attract them to 
its facilities. For a newly entered port, attracting port users is difficult due to the 
fierce competition amongst ports that are already in operation3), and it also faces a 
variety of entry barriers. 
There are broadly three, if not any less, types of entry barriers facing the new 
port.  Firstly, the barrier is closely associated with the characteristics of the port 
itself, particularly the size, as a natural monopoly arising from ever decreasing 
average costs of producing the port services.  Upon facing a new entry, incumbent 
ports can easily exercise the so-called predatory pricing particularly because 
of a small marginal cost for producing port services.  That is, any existing port 
may underbid and cut port dues as long as it can meet average variable costs for 
producing the services.4)  Therefore, facing such a predatory pricing, the newly 
1) That is, they have salvage values.  Haralambides (2002).
2) Strictly speaking, they are service providers at ports, rather than port users. But for expediency and also to differentiate them from 
port, we comprehensively refer them to port users in this paper.  An anonymous refereed pointed this out. 
3) The studies of Slacks (1985), Malchow and Kanafani (2004), and UN (2002) attribute the intensified inter-port competition to the 
containerisation of cargos and development of inter-modal transport systems.  However, de Langen (2007) attributes the competition 
to the expanded international trade, concentration of shipping industry and liberalisation of transport markets.
4) Haralambides (2002).
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entered port is hardly able to compete against the incumbent ports.  Secondly, the 
barrier can arise from the behavioural patterns and tendencies unveiled by port 
users. Such port users as cargo liners, shipping and freight companies, forwarders 
and so on tend to show a high degree of location boundedness (or location 
stickiness).5)  The high level of port loyalty revealed by these port users is closely 
related with port specific intangible advantages like customs clearance, clearance 
inspectors, etc which create agglomeration effects and clustering effects. In fact, 
because ports have fast morphed into one-stop integrated logistics hubs6) the 
location boundedness of the port users seems to increase even further.  Such a 
loyalty to the incumbent ports by the port users can become a serious entry barrier 
for any nascent port like a Korea’s newly opened Pohang-Youngil Container 
Port.  Lastly, but not at the least, is that existing ports provide various types of 
incentives to the port users with a view to retaining (and also to increasing) them 
and ever consolidating their port loyalty.  Providing various types of incentives is 
conveniently incorporated as a form into the inter-port competitions7) and acts as a 
significant entry barrier.
Facing these barriers and the ensued competition the new port has two 
fundamental choices to make. One is giving up the entry completely.  In this case, 
the government and regional administrative bodies which provided subsidies 
and public funds towards the construction of the port are hard to escape from 
the public blame for the wrong investment decision that they made.  They surely 
will struggle and ponder on how to recoup the huge sunk costs of the investment.  
Alternatively, the port decides to remain open and operate as long as it can meet 
in producing the port services its own average variable costs, which is relatively 
a small component out of the average total costs.  While surviving in the market, 
the port needs to find measures to tap any new opportunities for attracting more 
port users.  In order to overcome such entry barriers and veer onto port users, the 
new port also engages in the competition by aggressively providing various forms 
of incentives and benefits to them.  To a large extent, the port users’ choice of the 
location (i.e. port) can be influenced by these incentives and benefits, particularly 
provided that the ports in competition have many basic features and characteristics 
5) See Ha and Seo (2008) and Cahoon and Notteboom (2008) for example.
6) See Notteboom (2002) & Fleming and Baird (1999), for example.
7) Ha and Seo (2008) summarise various types of incentives used by Korean ports as well as other ports in the Asia-Pacific region.
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in common.
This paper theoretically explores the role that incentives play for the port 
users to choose the port for their operations while allowing differences in port 
size between different ports. In addressing this particular problem it is hoped 
that this paper contribute to the existing literature on the port selection and port 
competition from the game theoretic framework.  The methodology used in this 
paper is still quite nascent until now in dealing with transportation related research 
agenda. Nevertheless, the game theoretic approach is widely used in addressing 
many types of economic problem.8)  
It is well known that the incentives administered take various forms, and 
they usually include volume incentives proportional to the volume of container 
handling done by the port users.  Along with the pro rata volume incentives, 
the port also provides to port users a subsidy towards per unit operational costs 
by offering discounts for various port dues and fees, for piloting, tugging, 
stevedoring, warehousing, and so on.  The unit operational costs subsidy is also 
normally pertaining to the container handling volume. Additionally, when port 
users locate or relocate from the existing port of operation to a new port, location 
and settlement subsidies are utilized by the port, which are considered as another 
form of incentive. The former two types of incentives are those affecting the port 
users’ marginal costs for producing services at the port while the latter is more or 
less of a one-off incentive.
Our model in this paper abstracts and simplifies by assuming away much of 
the complexities involved in port pricing and incentive schemes. Instead, the 
model considers the incentive of per unit operational costs and a one-off incentive 
towards the firm’s relocation costs with a view to simplifying of the problems 
at hand and thus making the model more tractable.  In this game, each port 
simultaneously determines the level of incentives in the first stage. In the second 
stage, the port user (or the firm hence forth), as a monopolist of producing port 
related services at the chosen location, maximises its profits by taking that the 
level of the administered incentives is optimal at each port. 
The remaining part of the paper is structured as following. In the second section 
related literature on the inter-port competition are briefly reviewed and discussed 
8) See Gibbons (1992) and Barros and Cabral (2000), for example.
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in order to justify the necessity of this study. Section 3 develops a small game 
theoretic model where the two different incentives are structured in, as previously 
mentioned.  A backward induction solution to this two stage problem is found. 
However, we deliberately avoid welfare implications arising from this particular 
competition because the current model is set such that the competition takes 
place within the same country.9) This particular aspect of a single country inter-
port competition differentiates our paper from the previous studies in which inter-
port competition involved more than one sovereign state.10)  By doing so we can 
concentrate on demonstrating how the ports can attract new port users and how to 
react to when other ports are setting their own incentives.  Final section concludes 
the paper with some implications and possible extensions for further studies.
II. Literature Review
There are broadly two streams of literature dealing with inter-port competition.11)  
One stream addresses the extent to which port competition can be associated with 
the port’s excess capacity and thus accounts for how to prevent the port from 
abusing its market power as a natural monopolist. Some measures suggested 
by the literature in this stream include long run marginal cost pricing12) and also 
making the port service market contestable.13)  
The other stream focuses on the factors determining port’s competitiveness 
itself. In this stream the majority of available studies give priorities to 
investigating what attributes and characteristics affect the port user’s selection of 
the port for handling and distributing the freight.  Also receiving high priorities 
in this stream are some institutional and policy aspects surrounding the port’s 
competitiveness.14) For a methodological tool, these studies popularly adopted the 
analytic hierarch  process (AHP)15) framework or the discrete choice modelling 
9) Haralambides (2002) implied this particular consideration of competition within a single country.
10) de Langen (2007).
11) de Langen et al (2005) also discusses the benefits associated with within-port competition, in addition to the benefits associated 
with inter-port competition. See Slack (1985) and Haralambides (2002), among others, for the benefits associated with the latter.
12) Haralambides (2002), UN (2002), UNCTAD (1995), Goss (1999), and Goss and Stevens (2001), among others.
13) Notteboom (2002).
14) Fleming and Baird (1999).
15) Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is one of multiple criteria decision-making tool which has been the most widely used by 
decision markers and researchers. For details of AHP refer to Satty (1980).
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technique.16)  Although complicated and varying depending upon the parties 
involved (e.g. shippers and carriers) and the characteristics of the goods concerned 
the identified important factors include port’s location, infrastructure, efficiency in 
cargo handling, and frequency of port of calls, service, charges and fees, handling 
volume, transportation time, quality of equipment, as well as the existence of 
hinterland industrial complex.17)
While significant, these factors are more or less predetermined, and thus there 
is no room for such strategic variables as incentives (or pricing itself) to influence 
the port users’ selection of the port. In fact, it is argued that port pricing is a 
strategic issue,18) and port fees are recognised as one of important factors ensuring 
port’s competitiveness.19)  
Methodologically, the very fact that ports are competing with each other and set 
rates and adopt certain incentive schemes can be aptly considered within a game 
theoretic framework. Contrary to the mounting needs for modelling strategic 
considerations, game theoretic approaches have, so far, been hardly used in 
dealing with port competitions, leaving an undesirably big vacuum. Kim, as an 
exception to the literature vacuum, recognises that port’s competition and liner’s 
hub port strategy can be easily dealt within a game theoretic framework.20) In 
spite of the importance of the incentives affecting port users’ choice of the port, 
however, neither incentive scheme nor the port size is explicitly considered in 
Kim’s study.  This paper makes a further deviation from Kim’s study by assuming 
that our port user does not engage in any further competition for pricing for the 
port related service that it will produce.  Therefore, the port user in our model 
acts also as a monopolist of producing port related services while each port 
strategically decides port charges.21)
16) Malchow and Kanafani (2004).
17) Refer to Lu (2009), de Langen (2007), Kim et al. (2006) and references there in.
18) UNCTAD (1995).
19) UN (2002). Lu (2009) identifies that port incentives are one of eight important factors affecting Kaohsiung’s container 
development strategic capacity.
20) Kim (2004), p.179.
21) In this regard our models becomes pseudo-game theoretic because the monopolist does not engage in any further strategic actions 
while only ports are exercising strategic behaviours in the first stage.
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III. The Model
A port user, i.e. the firm here after, has a choice of locating at either port 1 or 
port 2.  Once the location for its production is chosen, the firm faces a demand 
curve for its output, i.e. port services, in port i only due to the firm’s location 
boundedness or the location stickiness the firm.  It is further assumed that the 
other is no longer serviced. 
And the demand function facing the firm in port i is given below.
  2or  1ifor  BPaQ iii        (1)
where Q is the quantity of port services that the firm produces such as container 
handling volume and other related services; P is per unit price for the port service, 
and B is the capture-all size parameter of the port, such as the number of berths for 
handling container ships, the size of hinterland container yardage or the number 
of gantry cranes, etc.22)  
Thus, by turning the equation (1) as the inverse demand function the revenue 
function of the firm operating in port i is specified as:
2 1,  ifor  QB
QaR i
i
i
i 

        (2)
The firm operating in port i incurs production costs, including fixed and variable 
costs.  It is likely that the fixed cost component, F, is identical regardless of the 
port that it decides to locate at.  However, the port provides to the firm some 
locating and settlement subsidies, which is one-off payments, Ai, which could 
vary from port to port.  For the variable cost, it is assumed that the firm has to 
pay per unit cost, w, which is also assumed identical, irrespective of the choice 
of the production location.  Although the same marginal cost assumption sounds 
extreme, it is acceptable that it reflects wage cost within a single country, as the 
model assumes. It is commonly observed that the firm receives some form of 
incentives from the port authority or from a designated port operator as one mode 
22) This demand function looks overly simplified as a anonymous referee pointed out.  However, it captures the major features such 
as a negative relationship between the price of port services, as well as the port size variable.
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of inter-port competition, when operating in the port. Due to the nature of the 
incentives provided by each port the firm’s marginal cost can be reduced through 
the per unit incentive scheme, z, provided to the firm.23)  We also assume that per 
unit incentives vary from port to port.
By incorporating the above mentioned incentive structures and dropping out the 
threshold requirements,24) the firm’s cost function in port i is given as following:
      ifor  AFQzwC iiii  1, 2    (3)
Combining (2) and (3) produces the profit function for the firm in port i which is 
given:
    ifor  AFQzwQBQa iiiiiii   1, 2  (4)
The first order profit maximizing condition for the firm yields:
    ifor  
2
 iii zwaBQ 1, 2     (5)
 
Equation (5) requires that it is satisfied
  0 izwa .        (6)
 
The profit maximising condition shows that the firm’s optimal output is 
positively related with the size of the port measured by B and the incentive 
scheme, the subsidy toward the marginal operational costs, z.
 Proposition 1
Once the port is selected, the firm’s production level of the output, i.e. port-
related services, depends positively on the size of the port and the level of 
incentives.25)
23) Typically the incentives are performance based.  Then, it may not be cost reducing.  However, when port users are receiving 
them, it is said that the incentives are not part of the firm’s revenues.  Instead, it only partly makes up the cost of production, 
particularly the losses the firm incurs. See Ha and Seo (2008).
24) This particular condition the threshold barely applies particularly when the port is a newly opened one.  For the structure of pro 
rata volume incentives, the threshold with an incentive ceiling, refer to the appendix.
25) Proof of this proposition is taking partial derivates of (EQ5) with respect to B and z, respectively.
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Proof
It is straight forward by taking partial differentiations of equation (5). We fi nd:
   (Q.E.D)
However, equation (5) does not assure that the fi rm will move to port i.  Instead, 
it merely shows that once the location for its operation is chosen, the firm’s 
optimal output level depends on the port size and also on the marginal cost 
subsidy rate.  Note that the one-off lump sum payments do not affect the fi rm’s 
output level in port i, but it may affect the fi rm’s initial choice of the location.  
 Corollary 1-1
Once the port is chosen, port’s lump-sum payments of the location or relocation 
subsidy have no infl uence over the fi rm’s level of output production.  But it may 
affect the fi rm’s initial choice of port.
Proof
It is self evident in equation (5), no port size variables appear to affect the 
production level. (Q.E.D)
What determines, then, the firm’s choice for the production location?  It is 
obvious that the fi rm’s location choice depends on the relative profi t rates between 
the two ports, ceteris paribus.
Substituting Equation (5) into Equation (4) and rearranging, the (optimal) profi t 
function is written:
     ifor  AFzwa
4
B
i
2
i
i
i 
 
1, 2   (7)
Given this profi t function, the fi rm will choose port 1 if and only if 21  . In 
other words, port 1 will be the production location in which the fi rm operates if:
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        0 AFzwa
4
B- AFzwa
4
B
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
21 


   (8)
Rearranging equation (8) and assuming 21 AA  26), the above condition is 
expressed as:
   222211 zwa4
Bzwa
4
B      (9)
Letting 
2
12
B
Bλ  a scalar representing the relative size of port 1 to port 2;
    2221 zwazwa λ           (10)
From equation (10) the possible solution due to the condition of equation (6) is 
derived such that:
    21 zwazwa        (11) 
Rearranging equation (11) shows the following relationship between z1 and z 2: 
  wazz  λλ 112       (12)
<Table 1> Ranges of the Marginal Cost Incentives for Port 1 and Port 2
21 BB   -   01    0wa  -    0wa1  (Case 1-1)  0wa  -    0wa1  (Case 1-2)
21 BB   -   01    0wa  -    0wa1  (Case 2-1)  0wa  -    0wa1  (Case 2-2)
Equation (12) shows the ranges for the marginal cost incentive that port 1 can 
set so that the firm chooses it as the location for producing port-related services 
(Table 1). In fact, equation (12) is known as the reaction functions for the port 1 
and port 2.
(Case 1-1) and Case (1-2) in Table 1 refer to the situation in which port 1 is 
greater in size than port 2 while (Case 2-1) and (Case 2-2), vice versa. Figure 1 
26) Although this assumption is adopted to make the model tractable.  But this is not the unreasonable assumption.
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)2)
}2 )2
λ)( 
λ)( 
λ)( 
λ)( 
)( 
shows the location choice for the firm as represented by the reaction function of 
equation (12).  
With its relatively bigger size port 1 still needs to act strategically, as seen 
in the above cases and in Figure 1.  Port 1’s strategic action towards setting 
incentive rates depends critically on the sign of )( wa  .27) That is, port 1 has a 
significant buffer zone in (Case 1-1) until port 2 offers the incentive rates higher 
than   wa  λ1  at which the former’s positive incentive rates will kick in. 
In (Case 1-2), however, port 1 should provide at least the marginal incentive rate 
of    λλ 1wa  or higher in order to attract the firm to the port. Otherwise, it 
will lose the firm to port 2. Whether port 1 is considering the level of the marginal 
incentive rate as depicted in (Case 1-1) or (Case 1-2) depends on the relative port 
size and also on the sign of )( wa  .
When port 1 is smaller in size relative to port 2, (Case 2-1) shows the same 
reaction curve as in (Case 1-2), while (Case 2-2) equivalent to (Case 1-1), which 
is given in Figure 2.28)
 Proposition 2
The provision of incentives by port 1 higher than those by port 2 depends on the 
relative port size and on the sign of (a-w).
Proof
Refer to Figure 1 and Figure 2. (Q.E.D)
27) Note that the condition given in equation (6) allows (a-w) positive or negative as seen in this table.
28) It seems the reaction ranges seemed the same irrespective of the size. However, there still exist delicate differences when the 
port is chosen.  The differences depend on the sign for (a-w), depending on the relative size.  But he figure hides delicate differences 
between the reactions.
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<Figure 1> Port size, Marginal Cost Incentive and the Choice of Port
<Case 1-1> <Case 1-2>
<Figure 2> Port size, Marginal Cost Incentive and the Choice of Port
<Case 2-1> <Case 2-2>
The remaining question is: how can port 1 retain the firm at the incumbent 
location when port 2 sets its own incentive rate?  And by how much should port 
1 react in response in order to keep it in the same place?  The answer to these 
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questions can be easily found when working with the reaction functions given in 
equation (12). 
That is, by differentiating the reaction function of the 1st port with respect to the 
second port’s changes in the incentive level the implied relationship can be found.  
In fact, the reaction function equation (12) yields:
      (13)
That is, the changes in the port 1’s incentive rate are to be more than what 
it is inversely proportional to the relative size of the ports, which can be 
predetermined, as seen in equation (13).
 Proposition 3
The level of changes in the incentive provisions by one port is more than the 
inversed relative size of the port to the other port if the former intends to keep the 
firm at its incumbent location when the latter offers its own incentives, ceteris 
paribus.
Proof
From equation (13), . (Q.E.D)
IV. Concluding Remarks
Many studies note that ports are highly in competition with other neighbouring 
ports due to containerisation, development of intermodal transport, expansion 
of international trade, concentration of shipping industry and liberalisation of 
transport markets.29)  In such a competitive environment, port can no longer take 
for granted port users and their loyalty in the location.  Previous studies heavily 
researched on understanding the nature of inter-port competition and identifying 
the factors which affect port’s competitiveness.  However, port pricing and the 
29) Haralambides (2002), Notteboom (2002), and de Langen (2007), to list a few.
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provision of incentives by the ports involved in competition have not yet drawn 
adequate attentions in the literature from researchers as a strategic consideration.
This paper demonstrates by taking such a competition within a pseudo game 
theoretic framework that once a port is chosen, the level of port service production 
by the firm, i.e. the port user, positively depends on the port size as well as the 
level of the incentives administered at the selected port.  In coming to selecting 
an actual port for the operation, the port user’s port selection can be influenced by 
strategically set incentive levels, given the relative size of the ports, when inter-
port competition takes the form of incentive schemes which contribute to the 
marginal cost pricing by the port. It further demonstrates that the changes in the 
level of the incentives provided by one port when the other port veers onto its 
incumbent port users by offering another set of incentives should be more than the 
inversed relative size of the ports involved.  
Nevertheless, the paper acknowledges as limitations that the competition is 
oversimplified to make only the problem tractable while deliberately avoiding 
any welfare analysis30) of the model by restricting the competition taking place 
in a singly sovereign country. By including the more strategic considerations the 
game theoretic approach to the inter-port competition can have rich application 
opportunities to the real problem although there remain some complexities 
involved in calculation process.  One immediate application of the game theoretic 
approach is applying the leader-follower model to the hub port and feeder port 
strategies.*
30) In fact, the welfare analysis is relatively simple and straight forward in the current setting because the total welfare at the selected 
port is the sum of the monopolist’s surplus and revenues that the port received from the port operation, i.e. (wQ1 + Monopolist’s 
surplus) – ziQ1 = (w-zi)Qi + Monopolist’s surplus.
* Date of Contribution ; Sept. 17, 2009
   Date of Acceptance ; Nov. 30, 2009
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Appendix: Pro rata volume incentives
In this paper, it is assumed that the incentives, i.e. the pecuniary volume 
incentive, are proportional at i to the fi rm’s output, i.e. the amount of container 
handling volume. However, it is also common that the fi rm should satisfy certain 
threshold volume, Q0 , before they qualify any volume incentive, while there is 
a ceiling on the volume incentive, Smax, beyond the certain container handling 
volume, Q1. 
Therefore, the incentive structure can be expressed as: 
1
max
i
0i
10iiii
QQfor  SS
QQfor  0S
QQQfor  QS



  
       
       (Appendix EQ 1)
Graphically the structure of the volume incentive can be graphically represented 
in Figure 1. 
<Appendix Figure 1> Volume Incentives
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